30 April 2009

Collective Action

So this is my inaugural actual Mancur Olsen-related post (of roving bandit fame).

Is there a collective action problem in parliamentary scrutiny in multi-party systems?

In an American-style 2-party system the oppositions reaps 100% of the political benefits from asking awkward questions of the government, but in a more European multi-party system the gains from scrutiny of government may be spread amongst several opposition parties. Could this reduce the incentive for opposition parties and their members to scrutinise the government?

Just a thought. And a potentially testable one. In fact it might well have been in which case I'd love to know. Abhijeet suggests Indian data would be perfect for a rich cross-state panel.


Tanya Burnasheva said...

Where  I can find some articles or documents about Mancur Olson theory, especially about term "roving bandit"? Please, you are my last hope. I'm writing the scientific work and I must give original links with in the list of using literature. But I have just only translations of his some works into russian. It is less, than I need.
Also, I'm a little doubt in the its authenticity and objectivity of that translator...Thak you in advance!

Tanya Burnasheva said...

Oh, I have unadvanced english, that's why I could not find the english articles or another sources. Sorry for my molestation!

rovingbandit said...

The roving bandit analogy comes from his book power and prosperity, so might be hard to find anything online. Here is a v short summary: http://wikisum.com/w/Olson:_Power_and_prosperity

Post a Comment