Showing posts with label Sudan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sudan. Show all posts

25 April 2025

How Sudanese bombers work

The vast majority of aerial attacks are by Antonov aircraft, Russian cargo planes that Khartoum is reliably reported to be adding to its current fleet. It is crucial here to understand what an Antonov "bomber" is: the Antonov is a Russian-made cargo plane, and in no way designed for use as an attack aircraft. There are no bomb sighting mechanisms; there are no bomb racks or bays; typically, crude (and cheap) barrel "bombs" are filled with scrap metal, unusable ordnance, and other shrapnel-producing materials, as well as an explosive medium---and are simply rolled out the back cargo bay. These bombs explode not with a large blast capability (and often do not explode at all), but have enough force to generate a hail of deadly shrapnel in all directions. Moreover, for protection against ground fire and anti-aircraft fire, the SAF Antonovs typically fly at altitudes of about 5,000 meters---far too high to permit any kind of militarily purposeful aerial targeting. They are not by nature a military weapon, but a tool for civilian destruction and terror.
One more post from Eric Reeves, an extract from his Jan 2012 update report on bombings.

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps? (AP South Sudan War Reporting Edition)

Update: My friend just told me off. A lot of these reporters are up around the border right now and have seen some horrific shit. I have mad respect for anyone who is going to the border to report right now. You are far braver than me. There's just not a lot I can do apart from watch this stuff unfold, and get angry when I see what comes across as biased reporting. So without taking back any of the substance of what is below, none of this is personal, and I hugely respect anyone who is risking going to the border.

---

Ahem. So to borrow a meme from Brad Delong, why oh why can't we have a better press corps?
The president of newly independent South Sudan has told China's president that attacks by rival Sudan amount to a declaration of war on his country. 
There has yet to be a formal declaration of war by either of the Sudans, and Salva Kiir's remark, made in Beijing during talks with Hu Jintaoon Tuesday, signals a ratcheting up of rhetoric  between the rival nations, which have been teetering on the brink of war. [my italics]
This is after Omar al-Bashir has called Salva Kiir an insect, vowed to overthrow his democratically elected government, push him out of Juba, and instructed his army that Southerners only understand the language of the gun.

Could someone please explain to AP what "ratcheting up" and "rhetoric" mean?

24 April 2025

A history of bombing by the Sudan Air Force in Sudan

As well as maintaining databases of over 1500 individual bombing incidents, Eric Reeves has also put together a handy infographic of bombing incidents in both North and South Sudan conducted by the Khartoum regime. The file is quite big. Blame Khartoum.


Open publication - Free publishing - More bombing

Nice one Hilda!

Hilde Johnson (Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for South Sudan and head of the UN Peacekeeping Mission) said yesterday
“I remind the parties to the conflict of their obligation to abide by international human rights and humanitarian law, take all measures not to harm civilians, and guarantee the safety of international aid organizations and United Nations personnel and assets,”
Hilda! Why didn't you remind them sooner! That Omar al-Bashir is so forgetful, he's always forgetting about the whole "not allowed to kill civilians" thing, like the time he did all the crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur that the ICC wants to arrest him for. And his generals are always forgetting that they aren't supposed to bomb civilians or United Nations bases, like the time when they did that last week

The Sudan Air Force actually seems to be really forgetful. Below is a spreadsheet, compiled by Eric Reeves, of bombing attacks between June and September 2011. There 73 separate attacks. Maybe we should help them set up a daily email reminder or something?


Key Source Lat/Long Village/payam Vicinity County/Locality Date Type Casualties
(v) denotes vicinity
1 OHCHR 29°43'E   11°01'N Al Massani Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 06-Jun-11 bombing unknown
2 OHCHR 29°39'E   11°55'N* Shivi Dilling Locality South Kordofan 08-Jun-11 bombing 2 killed
3 HRW 30°31'E   11°05'N Kauda Kauda Locality South Kordofan 14-Jun-11 bombing unknown
4 HRW 30°31'E   11°05'N Kauda Kauda Locality South Kordofan 19-Jun-11 bombing unknown
5 HRW 30°03'E   11°01'N Um Sirdeeba Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 19-Jun-11 bombing 10 total casualties
6 HRW 30°31'E   11°05'N Kauda Kauda Locality South Kordofan 22-Jun-11 5 bombs 1 killed
7 HRW 30°31'E   11°05'N Kauda Kauda Locality South Kordofan 24-Jun-11 bombing unknown
8 OHCHR 29°33'E   11°41'N Julud Kauda Locality South Kordofan 25-Jun-11 2 bombs unknown
9 HRW 30°03'E   11°01'N Um Sirdeeba Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 26-Jun-11 bombing 2 total casualties
10 HRW 30°06'E   11°02'N Kurchi Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 26-Jun-11 bombing 33+ total casulties
11 Amnesty International 30°15'E   11°15'N* Tangale Kauda Locality South Kordofan 29-Jun-11 6 bombs 3 injured
12 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   11°01'N* Alahmeir Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 29-Jun-11 bombing unknown
13 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   11°01'N* Abu Hashim Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 29-Jun-11 bombing unknown
14 Radio Dabanga 30°06'E   11°02'N Koroji Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 29-Jun-11 bombing unknown
15 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   11°01'N* Um Sirdiba Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 29-Jun-11 bombing unknown
16 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   11°01'N* Alhamra Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 29-Jun-11 bombing unknown
17 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   11°01'N* Elatmor Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 29-Jun-11 bombing unknown
18 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   11°01'N* Alabo Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 29-Jun-11 bombing unknown
19 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   11°01'N* Tibla Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 30-Jun-11 bombing unknown
20 Radio Dabanga 30°06'E   11°02'N Koroji Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 30-Jun-11 bombing unknown
21 Amnesty International 30°31'E   11°05'N Kororak Kauda Locality South Kordofan 01-Jul-11 2 bombs 1 killed
22 Radio Dabanga 24°27'E   13°29'N* Tibra Kabkabiya Locality North Darfur Jul-11 bombing unknown
23 HRW 30°06'E   11°02'N* Saraf Jamus Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 02-Jul-11 bombing 4 total casualties
24 Amnesty International 30°15'E   11°15'N* Tunguli Kauda Locality South Kordofan 08-Jul-11 6 bombs 1 killed
25 AFP 25°12'E   12°38'N*  Abu Hamara Shearia Locality South Darfur 09-Jul-11 bombing 3 total casualties
26 Radio Dabanga 25°16'E   12°38'N*  Mnoacy (v) Shearia Locality South Darfur 13-Jul-11 bombing unknown
27 Radio Dabanga 25°16'E   12°38'N*  Marshenq (v) Shearia Locality South Darfur 13-Jul-11 bombing unknown
28 Radio Dabanga 25°16'E   12°38'N  Khor Abeche (v) Shearia Locality South Darfur 13-Jul-11 bombing unknown
29 Radio Dabanga 25°16'E   12°38'N*  Hamada (v) Shearia Locality South Darfur 13-Jul-11 bombing unknown
30 Radio Dabanga 24°27'E   13°29'N* Kerubino Kabkabiya Locality North Darfur 14-Jul-11 bombing unknown
31 Radio Dabanga 24°27'E   13°29'N* Abouhmrh Linda Kabkabiya Locality North Darfur 14-Jul-11 bombing unknown
32 Radio Dabanga 24°27'E   13°29'N* Abokora Kabkabiya Locality North Darfur 14-Jul-11 bombing unknown
33 OCHA 29°45'E   11°01'N* Miri Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 25-Jul-11 bombing unknown
34 OCHA 30°31'E   11°05'N* Moro Kauda Locality South Kordofan 26-Jul-11 bombing unknown
35 HRW 30°03'E   11°01'N Um Sirdeeba Kadugli Locality South Kordofan Aug-11 bombing 3 injured
36 Radio Netherlands Worldwide 29°39'E   12°03'N Koleli Dilling Locality South Kordofan Aug-11 3 bombs 2 killed
37 Confidential source 29°59'E   10°18'N Jau Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 10-Aug-11 8 bombs unknown
38 Confidential source 29°59'E   10°18'N Jau Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 11-Aug-11 bombing unknown
39 HRW 30°06'E   11°02'N Kurchi Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 14-Aug-11 bombing unknown
40 HRW 30°06'E   11°02'N Kurchi Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 19-Aug-11 3 bombs unknown
41 Radio Dabanga 29°39'E   11°55'N* Kajora Dilling Locality South Kordofan 21-Aug-11 bombing unknown
42 Radio Dabanga 29°39'E   11°55'N* Karko Dilling Locality South Kordofan 21-Aug-11 bombing unknown
43 Radio Dabanga 29°39'E   11°55'N* Mendel Dilling Locality South Kordofan 21-Aug-11 bombing unknown
44 Radio Dabanga 29°39'E   11°55'N* Toy Dilling Locality South Kordofan 21-Aug-11 bombing unknown
45 Radio Dabanga 29°39'E   11°55'N* Sepoy Dilling Locality South Kordofan 21-Aug-11 bombing unknown
46 HRW 30°06'E   11°02'N Kurchi Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 22-Aug-11 bombing 2 injured
47 Sudan Tribune 30°22'E   10°38'N* Wirni Talodi Locality South Kordofan Sep-11 4 bombs 1 killed
48 Radio Dabanga 30°22'E   10°38'N* Warenne Talodi Locality South Kordofan 01-Sep-11 17 bombs unknown
49 Radio Dabanga 29°58'E   10°35'N Torgi  Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 13-Sep-11 bombing 1+ total casualties
50 Radio Dabanga 29°58'E   10°37'N Al Buram Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 13-Sep-11 bombing unknown
51 Radio Dabanga 29°45'E   11°01'N Kadugli Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 13-Sep-11 17 bombs unknown
52 Radio Dabanga 29°45'E   11°01'N* Ilbati  Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 13-Sep-11 bombing unknown
53 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   11°01'N Umser Dibba Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 13-Sep-11 bombing unknown
54 USAID 30°33'E   11°02'N Kauda Kauda Locality South Kordofan 19-Sep-11 4 bombs 3 injured
55 Radio Dabanga 30°27'E   11°39'N* Cody Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 19-Sep-11 bombing 3 total casualties
56 OCHA 34°17'E   10°33'N Kurmuk Kurmuk County Blue Nile State 21-Sep-11 bombing unknown
57 USAID 34°17'E   10°33'N Kurmuk Kurmuk County Blue Nile State 23-Sep-11 bombing unknown
58 OCHA 34°17'E   10°33'N Kurmuk Kurmuk County Blue Nile State 24-Sep-11 bombing unknown
59 OCHA 34°17'E   10°33'N Kurmuk Kurmuk County Blue Nile State 25-Sep-11 bombing unknown
60 Sudan Tribune 28°15'E   09°58'N Kajama Abyei Locality South Kordofan 25-Sep-11 96 bombs unknown
61 OCHA 29°45'E   11°01'N Kadugli (v) Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 26-Sep-11 bombing unknown
62 OCHA 29°45'E   11°01'N Kadugli (v) Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 27-Sep-11 bombing unknown
63 Radio Dabanga 30°03'E   10°50'N* Umm Durain (v) Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 27-Sep-11 bombing 1 killed
64 Radio Dabanga 30°27'E   11°51'N* Abri Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 28-Sep-11 5 bombs 10 total casualties
65 Radio Dabanga 30°27'E   11°39'N Korgy Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 28-Sep-11 2 bombs unknown
66 Confidential source 30°27'E   11°51'N* Tongoli Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 28-Sep-11 2 bombs unknown
67 John Ashworth 30°27'E   11°51'N* Sabat (v)  Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 30-Sep-11 bombing unknown
68 Radio Dabanga 30°27'E   11°39'N Korgy Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 01-Oct-11 6 bombs unknown
69 Radio Dabanga 30°15'E   11°15'N* Tengil Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 01-Oct-11 3 bombs unknown
70 Radio Dabanga 29°58'E   10°37'N Al Buram Kadugli Locality South Kordofan 01-Oct-11 1 bomb unknown
71 AFP 34°17'E   10°33'N* Sali Kurmuk County Blue Nile State Sep-11 bombing 1 injured
72 AFP 34°17'E   10°33'N* Maiyas Kurmuk County Blue Nile State Sep-11 bombing  6 killed
73 ACJPS 34°21'E   11°46'N Al Damazein Ad Damazin District Blue Nile State 03-Sep-11 bombing  unknown









water reservoir destroyed

23 April 2025

Breaking: Aliens invade South Sudan

Photo: REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic

Today local residents, military officials and a Reuters journalist observed planes dropping bombs in South Sudan.
"I can see market stalls burning in Rubkona in the background and the body of a small child burning," he said.
But it wasn't Khartoum
"we absolutely did not bomb anywhere in South Sudan," said Sudan's military spokesman, Al-Sawarmi Khalid.
and it wasn't Juba, who don't have any planes.

It must be aliens invading. Someone call NASA.

(Really though, given how successful the air strike campaign against Gaddafi seems to have been, does nobody else think that Khartoum and Bashir have lost their airforce privileges yet? How many more civilians do they need to murder?)

20 April 2025

"South Sudan does not want war"

More from John Ashworth on the current hostilities.
I beg to add to what my friend Richard Downie says, quoted in article 4, below: the US "really need to be laying down the law to the government in Juba now... The U.S. has to be pulling out all the stops and get the South to withdraw from Heglig". This would be fine if the US had also been "laying down the law" and "pulling out all the stops" to get the government in Khartoum to withdraw from its illegal military occupation of Abyei, or its short-lived illegal military occupations of Jau, or its military attacks on its own citizens in the Nuba Mountrains and Blue Nile, or its bombing of refugee camps and other civilian locations well inside South Sudan, all of which happened long before the current round of fighting. This one-sided approach by the international community, which has basically condoned (at best ignored, at worst colluded with, as in the case of Abyei) Khartoum's actions over the last months and years but then comes down heavily on South Sudan when, after months of restraint, it is finally provoked into a very limited military response, will not bring lasting peace to the region. 
Articles 2 and 3, below, sum up part of the problem. President al Bashir has been treating South Sudan as if it is a recalcitrant province (which he can "discipline" and teach a "lesson") rather than an independent sovereign state. It has not really sunk in to the mentality in Sudan that they no longer control South Sudan. They (and the international community) seem to be somewhat surprised that South Sudan actually negotiates in pursuit of its own perceived interests. They are also shocked that, following months if not years of military restraint, South Sudan has finally asserted its sovereignty with a limited military response which has been remarkably successful. They may also not realise how popular this assertion of sovereignty is with the population. Nobody welcomes the economic austerity which will result from cutting off the flow of oil, and nobody wants a return to war, but nevertheless the population appears to be firmly behind their government in these measures which they consider a necessary response to Khartoum's attitudes and actions.

19 April 2025

War in Sudan

It seems that South Sudan is losing the PR war. The decisions to shut down Southern oil production and now to take Heglig do not seem to have been viewed favourably by the international community.

I started trying to write something this morning, but I just got angry and frustrated. Just in time, here is John Ashworth, who for me is the best and most articulate political analyst on Sudan going, and who is frankly worth quoting in full. I would strongly urge anyone with any influence on the matter to read it. John is clearly like me very biased in favour of South Sudan, but this bias is based on considerable evidence rather than whimsy, not least of which for me the fact that amongst all this moral equivalence between the two sides, there is still an international arrest warrant out for the President of Northern Sudan for murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, rape, pillaging, and intentionally directing attacks against civilians.

Here's John:
A senior international church leader said to me yesterday, "many statements, including those of AU and UN, seem to suggest that South Sudan just woke up one morning and decided to invade and occupy Heglig. And then they go ahead to apportion equal blame to the two states. We have to find a way of countering this perspective." The international discourse seems to be based on Khartoum's narrative. This must be balanced with Juba's narrative, not in order to support Juba's claim, but in the interests of resolving the problem. A one-sided approach will not lead to lasting peace. As Juba's Spokesperson Dr. Barnaba Marial says, “I think it is good that the Security Council first listens to the story of Heglig, and I think they have not listened adequately from our point of view" (article 6, below). 
Indeed South Sudan did NOT just wake up one morning and decide to occupy Heglig. It should be remembered that President Salva Kiir has always followed a policy of refraining from military action. In the run up to the referendum and independence, he specifically instructed his commanders not to be provoked by Khartoum's military aggression, and not to retaliate. This policy proved remarkably successful and helped to deliver a peaceful referendum and independence. 
The President then continued to pursue a similar non-military policy for 9 months or so after independence. Khartoum has walked out of negotiations, made unreasonable demands (eg demanding more than ten times the international standard fees for transit of South Sudanese oil through its pipelines), abrogated agreements which it had already signed (eg the peace deal with SPLM-N, the agreement on the status of South Sudanese in Sudan, to say nothing of the Abyei Protocol), continued its military occupation of the disputed area of Abyei, harassed South Sudanese in Sudan, continued to attack South Sudan's former allies in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, siphoned off (or stolen) a percentage of South Sudan's oil, attempted to build illegal pipelines, forcibly occupied the disputed area of Jau, bombed refugee camps and civilians well inside South Sudan, supported South Sudanese rebel movements (and allowed them to abduct and forcibly recruit South Sudanese in Sudan), stifled cross-border trade, and much more. As article 5, below, points out, "the Khartoum government has been launching ground and air attacks against [South Sudan] since it declared independence July 9 [2011]". During all of this, South Sudan's army did not retaliate offensively, limiting itself to pushing SAF out of Jau but stopping when it reached the current border (which is not the 1956 border). President Salva Kiir's policy of restraint was not popular in South Sudan; people were asking, "What is the matter with him?"

Now, after nine months of restraint in the face of intransigence and provocation by Khartoum, South Sudan has finally decided to assert itself a little, by following an SAF force which attacked South Sudan back to their base, the disputed town of Heglig/Panthou, and ensuring that it could no longer be used as a jumping off point for further aerial and ground attacks on South Sudan. It also made the political point that Heglig/Panthou is disputed, that the current border is not the 1956 border, and that it is erroneous to insist that a town is north or south of the 1956 border until the 1956 border has actually been demarcated to the satisfaction of both sides. It seems to be a very popular move amongst the people of South Sudan.

The result is that the international community leaps to blame South Sudan, which has been so restrained for so long. At the same time, President Omar Hassan al Bashir has now declared that his aim is to change the government in Juba, which he has described as "insects". Surely this is a rather serious matter, when a president declares that he will take military action to overthrow the government of another sovereign state? Can we now expect the international community to severely censure Khartoum and make it clear that any attempt to change the government of another sovereign state will be met with the strongest possible sanctions? Can we expect them to cease their "moral equivalence" and recognise that there is an aggressor here - and that aggressor is not the "insects" of South Sudan? Urging both sides to make peace is fine, but which is the side that has consistently refused to make peace, and which is the side that has acted in a restrained manner and genuinely tried not to be drawn into armed conflict? 
Note that South Sudan has offered to withdraw from Heglig/Panthou if the UN puts a neutral force there (articles 2 and 6, below), an offer which the international community is unlikely to accept because Khartoum will not agree. Again, which side is refusing to make peace in Heglig? 
I don't think I will ever understand the international community! 
The BBC makes two errors in article 1, below. Firstly, it is not true that Heglig is "generally recognised as Sudanese territory". Many analysts who actually know what they are talking about (as opposed to journalists, diplomats and politicians) argue that it is disputed. Millions of South Sudanese, Nuba and others "generally recognise" that Heglig belongs in South Sudan. Secondly, both sides do NOT "claim" Abyei. South Sudan claims that the residents of Abyei should have the referendum which they were promised in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to decide whether Abyei should be part of Sudan or South Sudan; Khartoum has blocked the referendum and occupied the area militarily.

28 February 2025

Oh hey I'm on the radio

Talking to Daniel Finnan about South Sudan for Radio France International (English), to be broadcast ALL ACROSS AFRICA tomorrow. With no preparation, and this was my first radio interview, so I hope I didn't say anything too stupid. Short version: I'm still hopelessly optimistic about a deal still being made on the oil pipeline fee.

"Optimistic there will be deal," in Sudan oil dispute, says South #Sudan commentator Lee Crawfurd @rovingbandit (mp3)

Listening to your own voice on tape sounds really weird

30 January 2025

South Sudan non sequitur

Simon Tisdall writes in the Guardian
disputes over oil revenue-sharing, cross-border conflict, and looming famine. These multiple crises combine to pose a fundamental question: can South Sudan survive as a viable state?
Which in a slightly round-about way is a nice reminder of the tremendous benefits of studying economics. Economics teaches you a handful of incredibly powerful core concepts which, once assimilated, you kind of take for granted, and forget that not everybody intuitively thinks this way. Supply and demand. Incentives. Opportunity cost.

Opportunity cost means asking "compared to what." Can South Sudan survive as a viable state compared to what? A Khartoum-led state whose most significant offerings to the South over the last 50 years have been bombs? In what sense was the Khartoum-led state "viable" in the South over the last 50 years?

It's a bit like sceptically asking a daily victim of domestic violence for 50 years whether they are really being realistic thinking that they can survive as a viable independent household.

Would you rather live in a weak state or a state that is literally trying to kill you?

24 January 2025

Hold on to your hats

So Juba has decided to stop oil production in South Sudan, in protest of Khartoum theft. Pre-independence, revenues from the South were split 50:50, and Khartoum have basically been trying to continue that by imposing arbitrary fees, asking for up to $30 per barrel (Juba claims that normal prices for pipeline transit fees in other countries are around $1 per barrel).

So now we have a war of attrition. Which side can afford to last out the longest before making a compromise? Who has the largest cash reserves relative to their recurrent spending demands? The numbers are probably not in the public domain, but Khartoum does at least have some other sources of revenue. Revenues in Juba must basically be zero now. But then Juba does probably have a more sympathetic population who seem to be behind the decision, and therefore with perhaps a greater appetite for dramatic spending cuts than citizens in Khartoum. Good luck Juba, and I pray this ends peacefully.

Do chime in if you have any insights.

Update: Alex de Waal notes that if the pipes are shut, it will take 6 months to get oil flowing again. The last chance to come to a deal is apparently Friday when Bashir and Kiir meet in Addis Ababa. 

13 April 2025

Cash Transfers Pilot in Southern Sudan from Save the Children

imageBefore the project started, I used to sit under a tree near the market and drink tea. Then the project started. I was able to save a little bit and buy a goat. One day, my goat became pregnant. Now I am able to sit under the tree and drink tea with milk.”
                                                                                              -UCT recipient, Mathiangdit Boma




Being an avid tea drinker myself, and knowing how much milk the Sudanese like in their tea, this story makes me (and, I imagine, Mathiangdit)  very happy.

In all seriousness, with fantastic timing I was just emailed a report from September 2010 evaluating Save the Children’s pilot cash transfer program in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Southern Sudan, which although isn’t really capable of measuring impact does importantly show that cash transfers are technically feasible in remote and conflict-affected areas.
  • If appropriate security precautions are followed and existing  security mechanisms utilized, cash  transfer is possible  in post-conflict settings where security  is considered a risk.
  • Cash transfers are not misused. 
  • The most important priorities for use of cash transfer are expenditures on education, health and assets. 
I couldn’t find a copy online so here it is (hope Save don’t mind sharing - putting a link on their Sudan page would be nice!).

31 March 2025

Prendergast is at Yale today

Speaking about post-secession Sudan. Any questions? So far suggestions include:

"How does it feel to have the privilege of doing real aid work with a humanitarian such as George Clooney?" 

and 

"Who does your hair?"

18 February 2025

Wisdom on Oil in Sudan

The excellent John Ashworth (who should really start a proper website) writes:

Oil has the potential to destabilise the two new countries, North and South Sudan. The economies of both countries rely heavily on oil revenue; the South more so than the North, but nevertheless it is a significant percentage of the North's national income. If the North does not receive adequate oil revenue, its economy will suffer, and it is not in the interests of the South to have a northern neighbour with a collapsing economy. Worse still, if the North were to retaliate by refusing to allow southern oil to be exported via its pipeline, the South would have virtually no income, and both countries could potentially become bankrupt and unstable.

Thus at first glance Pagan Amum's statement that there will be no sharing of oil revenue ("The notion of sharing wealth will not be there. There is no continuation, whether 50 percent or anything") gives cause for concern. It appears to contradict statements by SPLM last year that there would be a revenue-sharing agreement.

However there is room for manoeuvre when he continues, "There’s going to be an agreement on the South continuing exporting its oil through the pipeline in Northern Sudan and to Port Sudan, and the South will be paying pipeline fees for transportation... We may be paying a transit fee". Southerners may not like the idea of "sharing" their wealth with a separate country, but may find it easier to accept a simple commercial transaction which is a normal process elsewhere in the world - to pay for the use of the pipeline and also to pay a transit fee. These "commercial" fees would of course have to add up to an amount which Khartoum finds acceptable, so after some hard bargaining it would be no surprise if it came close to the existing 50% in real terms. One area where the South will benefit financially is that they will now control the oil revenue; it is widely believed that Khartoum is currently giving them less than their true 50% share.

While searching for new export routes will definitely benefit the South (especially if routes can be found which are both economically and practically feasible within a reasonable time frame), it would not be beneficial for the North, and could thus be a destabilising factor in relations between the two newly independent countries.

Thankfully I don’t think alternative routes are at all economically viable, a new pipeline through Kenya would be prohibitively expensive. But don’t let that stop Southern politicians dangling Kenya as a bargaining tool.

25 January 2025

Photo of the Day

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Of votes counted so far in the referendum, 98.81% have been for secession. Seems like a good occasion to post this photo of a billboard in Khartoum, taken by a friend during the  2008 Census.

11 January 2025

Southern Sudan: What happens next?

The referendum is finally here. I am overjoyed for the people of Southern Sudan. There is no doubt that there will be a resounding vote for independence. So what happens next?

The short answer - not very much actually changes. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has been in existence for 5 years now, with responsibility for the majority of core government functions.

There are serious challenges to be faced in terms of building functional capability and increasing accountability, but they are the same challenges which have existed for the past 5 years. Nothing is about to fall apart,  any more than it already has done.

With perhaps one major exception. GOSS has so far not had to deal with monetary policy, and this is a serious concern. Establishing a new currency and managing the risks of inflation for the first time will be extremely difficult. And as Keynes said, “There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose” (HT:TH).

Another concern is the potential for new borrowing once the South becomes a sovereign nation, which is really not needed when oil prices are so high and spending controls still too loose.

Southern Sudan has some smart leaders who understand many of the challenges. Robert Klitgaard discusses meeting Pagan Amum and Deng Alor in 2005, and the sharp grasp they had of the scourge of corruption and the difficulty in creating accountability. But good policy and good decisions take more than a few good individuals - establishing good systems is difficult and will take time, as will training enough mid- and lower level civil servants to run these systems.

A distinct positive should be an influx of Southern politicians and government officials from Khartoum, who have been serving as part of the Government of National Unity (GoNU). This influx will create some welcome competition for the top jobs (and hopefully not just new Ministries to accommodate them).

And finally one question to which I’m not sure anyone has the answer: what shall we call you country 193?

07 January 2025

ICG-CSIS Online Sudan Referendum Event

The Center for Strategic and International Studies is hosting a discussion

Sudan: Post-Referendum Scenarios and the Way Forward

on Monday, January 10, 2025 8:30am - 10:00am

with International Crisis Group’s new Africa Program Director, Comfort Ero, and its AU and Sudan Special Advisor, Fouad Hikmat. 

And if you can't make it to Washington D.C., you can watch it LIVE RIGHT HERE ON THE INTERWEBS. How about that eh?

27 December 2024

It's fashionable to knock GOSS

It's fashionable to knock GOSS, so it's refreshing to see an article which gives credit where credit is due… One hopes that this new-found respect for GOSS will spill over when the USA "urges Sudan’s Kiir to reach agreement with NCP" and that this will not lead to the "moral equivalence" argument so ably analysed by Eric Reeves in a piece I circulated on 22nd December 2010. GOSS, SPLM and the people of the south have already made significant concessions and have signed agreements with the NCP. The onus is now on NCP to implement what it has agreed, not on GOSS/SPLM to make further concessions.

John Ashworth

23 December 2024

The Royal African Society on the Sudan Referendum


The Royal African Society has put together a collection of opinion pieces on the referendum.

Stephen Chan from my old school SOAS nails it for me:

I do not see a return to war.    
Autonomous administration has meant the creation of a space of public administration AND the sense of defensible borders. Both sides have amassed traditional armour. War would mean not a return to guerrilla war, but the inauguration of conventional war. The oil blocks would be right in the middle. Neither China nor the West would tolerate any resort to significant hostilities. If Wikileaks bothered to look at the diplomatic cable traffic on this issue, that would become clear.  

10 December 2024

What happened to all the interventionists?

Khartoum has dropped 18 bombs on Southern Sudan, and Ggabo is trying to steal an election in Cote D'Ivoire. Where are the voices for forceful intervention? I'm not even saying that I would support such intervention (though I might), just curious as to why there is no debate?

UPDATE: I found one! G. Pascal Zachary, africanist-journo-professor asks:

Is it time to remove Gbagbo by force?

Rebecca?

07 December 2024

George Clooney in Southern Sudan

A few weeks back my Facebook newsfeed filled up with photos of grinning friends standing next to George Clooney in Juba's bars. Well this is what he was up to.



Kristof is somewhat predictably a fan.
I admire Clooney (and Ann Curry of NBC, who went with him and got an hour on Dateline) for trying to raise an alarm bell in the night. Let’s hope that the alarms, and the latest burst of diplomacy and spotlight on South Sudan, are enough to avert a new war.
Tom Murphy
worries that this over-simplifies what is going on in Sudan
I'm actually going to side with Kristof on this one. Whilst I don't think that a return to war is the most likely to outcome, it is a possibility, and given the track record of the US in helping to broker the 2005 CPA I do think that US diplomacy could be important in ensuring a peaceful outcome.

I don't think that a return to war is likely because I think that ultimately both sides are going to behave rationally, by which I mean in their own self-interest. The Khartoum government has a strong interest in not losing the oil revenues from the South, but an even stronger interest in not having all oil production come to a halt completely due to a return to war. The cost to the SPLM of building a new pipeline through Kenya is basically prohibitive, and they have already indicated that they would be willing to pay hefty pipeline fees to Khartoum, even to the point of extending the current 50:50 split.

Added to the mix for Khartoum is that arrest warrant for Bashir, the desire to get sanctions lifted, and the desire to get some relief on that $30bn of debt.

There is a lot of space for a mutually profitable deal to be made, if cool heads can be made to prevail.