The vast majority of aerial attacks are by Antonov aircraft, Russian cargo planes that Khartoum is reliably reported to be adding to its current fleet. It is crucial here to understand what an Antonov "bomber" is: the Antonov is a Russian-made cargo plane, and in no way designed for use as an attack aircraft. There are no bomb sighting mechanisms; there are no bomb racks or bays; typically, crude (and cheap) barrel "bombs" are filled with scrap metal, unusable ordnance, and other shrapnel-producing materials, as well as an explosive medium---and are simply rolled out the back cargo bay. These bombs explode not with a large blast capability (and often do not explode at all), but have enough force to generate a hail of deadly shrapnel in all directions. Moreover, for protection against ground fire and anti-aircraft fire, the SAF Antonovs typically fly at altitudes of about 5,000 meters---far too high to permit any kind of militarily purposeful aerial targeting. They are not by nature a military weapon, but a tool for civilian destruction and terror.
25 April 2025
How Sudanese bombers work
Why oh why can't we have a better press corps? (AP South Sudan War Reporting Edition)
---
Ahem. So to borrow a meme from Brad Delong, why oh why can't we have a better press corps?
The president of newly independent South Sudan has told China's president that attacks by rival Sudan amount to a declaration of war on his country.
There has yet to be a formal declaration of war by either of the Sudans, and Salva Kiir's remark, made in Beijing during talks with Hu Jintaoon Tuesday, signals a ratcheting up of rhetoric between the rival nations, which have been teetering on the brink of war. [my italics]This is after Omar al-Bashir has called Salva Kiir an insect, vowed to overthrow his democratically elected government, push him out of Juba, and instructed his army that Southerners only understand the language of the gun.
Could someone please explain to AP what "ratcheting up" and "rhetoric" mean?
24 April 2025
A history of bombing by the Sudan Air Force in Sudan
Nice one Hilda!
“I remind the parties to the conflict of their obligation to abide by international human rights and humanitarian law, take all measures not to harm civilians, and guarantee the safety of international aid organizations and United Nations personnel and assets,”
Key | Source | Lat/Long | Village/payam | Vicinity | County/Locality | Date | Type | Casualties |
(v) denotes vicinity | ||||||||
1 | OHCHR | 29°43'E 11°01'N | Al Massani | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 06-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
2 | OHCHR | 29°39'E 11°55'N* | Shivi | Dilling Locality | South Kordofan | 08-Jun-11 | bombing | 2 killed |
3 | HRW | 30°31'E 11°05'N | Kauda | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 14-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
4 | HRW | 30°31'E 11°05'N | Kauda | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 19-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
5 | HRW | 30°03'E 11°01'N | Um Sirdeeba | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 19-Jun-11 | bombing | 10 total casualties |
6 | HRW | 30°31'E 11°05'N | Kauda | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 22-Jun-11 | 5 bombs | 1 killed |
7 | HRW | 30°31'E 11°05'N | Kauda | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 24-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
8 | OHCHR | 29°33'E 11°41'N | Julud | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 25-Jun-11 | 2 bombs | unknown |
9 | HRW | 30°03'E 11°01'N | Um Sirdeeba | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 26-Jun-11 | bombing | 2 total casualties |
10 | HRW | 30°06'E 11°02'N | Kurchi | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 26-Jun-11 | bombing | 33+ total casulties |
11 | Amnesty International | 30°15'E 11°15'N* | Tangale | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 29-Jun-11 | 6 bombs | 3 injured |
12 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 11°01'N* | Alahmeir | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 29-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
13 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 11°01'N* | Abu Hashim | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 29-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
14 | Radio Dabanga | 30°06'E 11°02'N | Koroji | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 29-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
15 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 11°01'N* | Um Sirdiba | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 29-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
16 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 11°01'N* | Alhamra | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 29-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
17 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 11°01'N* | Elatmor | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 29-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
18 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 11°01'N* | Alabo | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 29-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
19 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 11°01'N* | Tibla | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 30-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
20 | Radio Dabanga | 30°06'E 11°02'N | Koroji | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 30-Jun-11 | bombing | unknown |
21 | Amnesty International | 30°31'E 11°05'N | Kororak | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 01-Jul-11 | 2 bombs | 1 killed |
22 | Radio Dabanga | 24°27'E 13°29'N* | Tibra | Kabkabiya Locality | North Darfur | Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
23 | HRW | 30°06'E 11°02'N* | Saraf Jamus | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 02-Jul-11 | bombing | 4 total casualties |
24 | Amnesty International | 30°15'E 11°15'N* | Tunguli | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 08-Jul-11 | 6 bombs | 1 killed |
25 | AFP | 25°12'E 12°38'N* | Abu Hamara | Shearia Locality | South Darfur | 09-Jul-11 | bombing | 3 total casualties |
26 | Radio Dabanga | 25°16'E 12°38'N* | Mnoacy (v) | Shearia Locality | South Darfur | 13-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
27 | Radio Dabanga | 25°16'E 12°38'N* | Marshenq (v) | Shearia Locality | South Darfur | 13-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
28 | Radio Dabanga | 25°16'E 12°38'N | Khor Abeche (v) | Shearia Locality | South Darfur | 13-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
29 | Radio Dabanga | 25°16'E 12°38'N* | Hamada (v) | Shearia Locality | South Darfur | 13-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
30 | Radio Dabanga | 24°27'E 13°29'N* | Kerubino | Kabkabiya Locality | North Darfur | 14-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
31 | Radio Dabanga | 24°27'E 13°29'N* | Abouhmrh Linda | Kabkabiya Locality | North Darfur | 14-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
32 | Radio Dabanga | 24°27'E 13°29'N* | Abokora | Kabkabiya Locality | North Darfur | 14-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
33 | OCHA | 29°45'E 11°01'N* | Miri | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 25-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
34 | OCHA | 30°31'E 11°05'N* | Moro | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 26-Jul-11 | bombing | unknown |
35 | HRW | 30°03'E 11°01'N | Um Sirdeeba | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | Aug-11 | bombing | 3 injured |
36 | Radio Netherlands Worldwide | 29°39'E 12°03'N | Koleli | Dilling Locality | South Kordofan | Aug-11 | 3 bombs | 2 killed |
37 | Confidential source | 29°59'E 10°18'N | Jau | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 10-Aug-11 | 8 bombs | unknown |
38 | Confidential source | 29°59'E 10°18'N | Jau | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 11-Aug-11 | bombing | unknown |
39 | HRW | 30°06'E 11°02'N | Kurchi | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 14-Aug-11 | bombing | unknown |
40 | HRW | 30°06'E 11°02'N | Kurchi | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 19-Aug-11 | 3 bombs | unknown |
41 | Radio Dabanga | 29°39'E 11°55'N* | Kajora | Dilling Locality | South Kordofan | 21-Aug-11 | bombing | unknown |
42 | Radio Dabanga | 29°39'E 11°55'N* | Karko | Dilling Locality | South Kordofan | 21-Aug-11 | bombing | unknown |
43 | Radio Dabanga | 29°39'E 11°55'N* | Mendel | Dilling Locality | South Kordofan | 21-Aug-11 | bombing | unknown |
44 | Radio Dabanga | 29°39'E 11°55'N* | Toy | Dilling Locality | South Kordofan | 21-Aug-11 | bombing | unknown |
45 | Radio Dabanga | 29°39'E 11°55'N* | Sepoy | Dilling Locality | South Kordofan | 21-Aug-11 | bombing | unknown |
46 | HRW | 30°06'E 11°02'N | Kurchi | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 22-Aug-11 | bombing | 2 injured |
47 | Sudan Tribune | 30°22'E 10°38'N* | Wirni | Talodi Locality | South Kordofan | Sep-11 | 4 bombs | 1 killed |
48 | Radio Dabanga | 30°22'E 10°38'N* | Warenne | Talodi Locality | South Kordofan | 01-Sep-11 | 17 bombs | unknown |
49 | Radio Dabanga | 29°58'E 10°35'N | Torgi | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 13-Sep-11 | bombing | 1+ total casualties |
50 | Radio Dabanga | 29°58'E 10°37'N | Al Buram | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 13-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
51 | Radio Dabanga | 29°45'E 11°01'N | Kadugli | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 13-Sep-11 | 17 bombs | unknown |
52 | Radio Dabanga | 29°45'E 11°01'N* | Ilbati | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 13-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
53 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 11°01'N | Umser Dibba | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 13-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
54 | USAID | 30°33'E 11°02'N | Kauda | Kauda Locality | South Kordofan | 19-Sep-11 | 4 bombs | 3 injured |
55 | Radio Dabanga | 30°27'E 11°39'N* | Cody | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 19-Sep-11 | bombing | 3 total casualties |
56 | OCHA | 34°17'E 10°33'N | Kurmuk | Kurmuk County | Blue Nile State | 21-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
57 | USAID | 34°17'E 10°33'N | Kurmuk | Kurmuk County | Blue Nile State | 23-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
58 | OCHA | 34°17'E 10°33'N | Kurmuk | Kurmuk County | Blue Nile State | 24-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
59 | OCHA | 34°17'E 10°33'N | Kurmuk | Kurmuk County | Blue Nile State | 25-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
60 | Sudan Tribune | 28°15'E 09°58'N | Kajama | Abyei Locality | South Kordofan | 25-Sep-11 | 96 bombs | unknown |
61 | OCHA | 29°45'E 11°01'N | Kadugli (v) | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 26-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
62 | OCHA | 29°45'E 11°01'N | Kadugli (v) | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 27-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
63 | Radio Dabanga | 30°03'E 10°50'N* | Umm Durain (v) | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 27-Sep-11 | bombing | 1 killed |
64 | Radio Dabanga | 30°27'E 11°51'N* | Abri | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 28-Sep-11 | 5 bombs | 10 total casualties |
65 | Radio Dabanga | 30°27'E 11°39'N | Korgy | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 28-Sep-11 | 2 bombs | unknown |
66 | Confidential source | 30°27'E 11°51'N* | Tongoli | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 28-Sep-11 | 2 bombs | unknown |
67 | John Ashworth | 30°27'E 11°51'N* | Sabat (v) | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 30-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
68 | Radio Dabanga | 30°27'E 11°39'N | Korgy | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 01-Oct-11 | 6 bombs | unknown |
69 | Radio Dabanga | 30°15'E 11°15'N* | Tengil | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 01-Oct-11 | 3 bombs | unknown |
70 | Radio Dabanga | 29°58'E 10°37'N | Al Buram | Kadugli Locality | South Kordofan | 01-Oct-11 | 1 bomb | unknown |
71 | AFP | 34°17'E 10°33'N* | Sali | Kurmuk County | Blue Nile State | Sep-11 | bombing | 1 injured |
72 | AFP | 34°17'E 10°33'N* | Maiyas | Kurmuk County | Blue Nile State | Sep-11 | bombing | 6 killed |
73 | ACJPS | 34°21'E 11°46'N | Al Damazein | Ad Damazin District | Blue Nile State | 03-Sep-11 | bombing | unknown |
water reservoir destroyed |

23 April 2025
Breaking: Aliens invade South Sudan
"I can see market stalls burning in Rubkona in the background and the body of a small child burning," he said.But it wasn't Khartoum
"we absolutely did not bomb anywhere in South Sudan," said Sudan's military spokesman, Al-Sawarmi Khalid.and it wasn't Juba, who don't have any planes.
It must be aliens invading. Someone call NASA.
(Really though, given how successful the air strike campaign against Gaddafi seems to have been, does nobody else think that Khartoum and Bashir have lost their airforce privileges yet? How many more civilians do they need to murder?)
20 April 2025
"South Sudan does not want war"
I beg to add to what my friend Richard Downie says, quoted in article 4, below: the US "really need to be laying down the law to the government in Juba now... The U.S. has to be pulling out all the stops and get the South to withdraw from Heglig". This would be fine if the US had also been "laying down the law" and "pulling out all the stops" to get the government in Khartoum to withdraw from its illegal military occupation of Abyei, or its short-lived illegal military occupations of Jau, or its military attacks on its own citizens in the Nuba Mountrains and Blue Nile, or its bombing of refugee camps and other civilian locations well inside South Sudan, all of which happened long before the current round of fighting. This one-sided approach by the international community, which has basically condoned (at best ignored, at worst colluded with, as in the case of Abyei) Khartoum's actions over the last months and years but then comes down heavily on South Sudan when, after months of restraint, it is finally provoked into a very limited military response, will not bring lasting peace to the region.
Articles 2 and 3, below, sum up part of the problem. President al Bashir has been treating South Sudan as if it is a recalcitrant province (which he can "discipline" and teach a "lesson") rather than an independent sovereign state. It has not really sunk in to the mentality in Sudan that they no longer control South Sudan. They (and the international community) seem to be somewhat surprised that South Sudan actually negotiates in pursuit of its own perceived interests. They are also shocked that, following months if not years of military restraint, South Sudan has finally asserted its sovereignty with a limited military response which has been remarkably successful. They may also not realise how popular this assertion of sovereignty is with the population. Nobody welcomes the economic austerity which will result from cutting off the flow of oil, and nobody wants a return to war, but nevertheless the population appears to be firmly behind their government in these measures which they consider a necessary response to Khartoum's attitudes and actions.
19 April 2025
War in Sudan
I started trying to write something this morning, but I just got angry and frustrated. Just in time, here is John Ashworth, who for me is the best and most articulate political analyst on Sudan going, and who is frankly worth quoting in full. I would strongly urge anyone with any influence on the matter to read it. John is clearly like me very biased in favour of South Sudan, but this bias is based on considerable evidence rather than whimsy, not least of which for me the fact that amongst all this moral equivalence between the two sides, there is still an international arrest warrant out for the President of Northern Sudan for murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, rape, pillaging, and intentionally directing attacks against civilians.
Here's John:
A senior international church leader said to me yesterday, "many statements, including those of AU and UN, seem to suggest that South Sudan just woke up one morning and decided to invade and occupy Heglig. And then they go ahead to apportion equal blame to the two states. We have to find a way of countering this perspective." The international discourse seems to be based on Khartoum's narrative. This must be balanced with Juba's narrative, not in order to support Juba's claim, but in the interests of resolving the problem. A one-sided approach will not lead to lasting peace. As Juba's Spokesperson Dr. Barnaba Marial says, “I think it is good that the Security Council first listens to the story of Heglig, and I think they have not listened adequately from our point of view" (article 6, below).
Indeed South Sudan did NOT just wake up one morning and decide to occupy Heglig. It should be remembered that President Salva Kiir has always followed a policy of refraining from military action. In the run up to the referendum and independence, he specifically instructed his commanders not to be provoked by Khartoum's military aggression, and not to retaliate. This policy proved remarkably successful and helped to deliver a peaceful referendum and independence.
The President then continued to pursue a similar non-military policy for 9 months or so after independence. Khartoum has walked out of negotiations, made unreasonable demands (eg demanding more than ten times the international standard fees for transit of South Sudanese oil through its pipelines), abrogated agreements which it had already signed (eg the peace deal with SPLM-N, the agreement on the status of South Sudanese in Sudan, to say nothing of the Abyei Protocol), continued its military occupation of the disputed area of Abyei, harassed South Sudanese in Sudan, continued to attack South Sudan's former allies in the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, siphoned off (or stolen) a percentage of South Sudan's oil, attempted to build illegal pipelines, forcibly occupied the disputed area of Jau, bombed refugee camps and civilians well inside South Sudan, supported South Sudanese rebel movements (and allowed them to abduct and forcibly recruit South Sudanese in Sudan), stifled cross-border trade, and much more. As article 5, below, points out, "the Khartoum government has been launching ground and air attacks against [South Sudan] since it declared independence July 9 [2011]". During all of this, South Sudan's army did not retaliate offensively, limiting itself to pushing SAF out of Jau but stopping when it reached the current border (which is not the 1956 border). President Salva Kiir's policy of restraint was not popular in South Sudan; people were asking, "What is the matter with him?"
Now, after nine months of restraint in the face of intransigence and provocation by Khartoum, South Sudan has finally decided to assert itself a little, by following an SAF force which attacked South Sudan back to their base, the disputed town of Heglig/Panthou, and ensuring that it could no longer be used as a jumping off point for further aerial and ground attacks on South Sudan. It also made the political point that Heglig/Panthou is disputed, that the current border is not the 1956 border, and that it is erroneous to insist that a town is north or south of the 1956 border until the 1956 border has actually been demarcated to the satisfaction of both sides. It seems to be a very popular move amongst the people of South Sudan.
The result is that the international community leaps to blame South Sudan, which has been so restrained for so long. At the same time, President Omar Hassan al Bashir has now declared that his aim is to change the government in Juba, which he has described as "insects". Surely this is a rather serious matter, when a president declares that he will take military action to overthrow the government of another sovereign state? Can we now expect the international community to severely censure Khartoum and make it clear that any attempt to change the government of another sovereign state will be met with the strongest possible sanctions? Can we expect them to cease their "moral equivalence" and recognise that there is an aggressor here - and that aggressor is not the "insects" of South Sudan? Urging both sides to make peace is fine, but which is the side that has consistently refused to make peace, and which is the side that has acted in a restrained manner and genuinely tried not to be drawn into armed conflict?
Note that South Sudan has offered to withdraw from Heglig/Panthou if the UN puts a neutral force there (articles 2 and 6, below), an offer which the international community is unlikely to accept because Khartoum will not agree. Again, which side is refusing to make peace in Heglig?
I don't think I will ever understand the international community!
The BBC makes two errors in article 1, below. Firstly, it is not true that Heglig is "generally recognised as Sudanese territory". Many analysts who actually know what they are talking about (as opposed to journalists, diplomats and politicians) argue that it is disputed. Millions of South Sudanese, Nuba and others "generally recognise" that Heglig belongs in South Sudan. Secondly, both sides do NOT "claim" Abyei. South Sudan claims that the residents of Abyei should have the referendum which they were promised in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to decide whether Abyei should be part of Sudan or South Sudan; Khartoum has blocked the referendum and occupied the area militarily.

28 February 2025
Oh hey I'm on the radio
Listening to your own voice on tape sounds really weird.

30 January 2025
South Sudan non sequitur
disputes over oil revenue-sharing, cross-border conflict, and looming famine. These multiple crises combine to pose a fundamental question: can South Sudan survive as a viable state?Which in a slightly round-about way is a nice reminder of the tremendous benefits of studying economics. Economics teaches you a handful of incredibly powerful core concepts which, once assimilated, you kind of take for granted, and forget that not everybody intuitively thinks this way. Supply and demand. Incentives. Opportunity cost.
Opportunity cost means asking "compared to what." Can South Sudan survive as a viable state compared to what? A Khartoum-led state whose most significant offerings to the South over the last 50 years have been bombs? In what sense was the Khartoum-led state "viable" in the South over the last 50 years?
It's a bit like sceptically asking a daily victim of domestic violence for 50 years whether they are really being realistic thinking that they can survive as a viable independent household.
Would you rather live in a weak state or a state that is literally trying to kill you?
24 January 2025
Hold on to your hats
So now we have a war of attrition. Which side can afford to last out the longest before making a compromise? Who has the largest cash reserves relative to their recurrent spending demands? The numbers are probably not in the public domain, but Khartoum does at least have some other sources of revenue. Revenues in Juba must basically be zero now. But then Juba does probably have a more sympathetic population who seem to be behind the decision, and therefore with perhaps a greater appetite for dramatic spending cuts than citizens in Khartoum. Good luck Juba, and I pray this ends peacefully.
Do chime in if you have any insights.
Update: Alex de Waal notes that if the pipes are shut, it will take 6 months to get oil flowing again. The last chance to come to a deal is apparently Friday when Bashir and Kiir meet in Addis Ababa.
13 April 2025
Cash Transfers Pilot in Southern Sudan from Save the Children

-UCT recipient, Mathiangdit Boma
Being an avid tea drinker myself, and knowing how much milk the Sudanese like in their tea, this story makes me (and, I imagine, Mathiangdit) very happy.
In all seriousness, with fantastic timing I was just emailed a report from September 2010 evaluating Save the Children’s pilot cash transfer program in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Southern Sudan, which although isn’t really capable of measuring impact does importantly show that cash transfers are technically feasible in remote and conflict-affected areas.
- If appropriate security precautions are followed and existing security mechanisms utilized, cash transfer is possible in post-conflict settings where security is considered a risk.
- Cash transfers are not misused.
- The most important priorities for use of cash transfer are expenditures on education, health and assets.

31 March 2025
Prendergast is at Yale today
18 February 2025
Wisdom on Oil in Sudan
The excellent John Ashworth (who should really start a proper website) writes:
Oil has the potential to destabilise the two new countries, North and South Sudan. The economies of both countries rely heavily on oil revenue; the South more so than the North, but nevertheless it is a significant percentage of the North's national income. If the North does not receive adequate oil revenue, its economy will suffer, and it is not in the interests of the South to have a northern neighbour with a collapsing economy. Worse still, if the North were to retaliate by refusing to allow southern oil to be exported via its pipeline, the South would have virtually no income, and both countries could potentially become bankrupt and unstable.
Thus at first glance Pagan Amum's statement that there will be no sharing of oil revenue ("The notion of sharing wealth will not be there. There is no continuation, whether 50 percent or anything") gives cause for concern. It appears to contradict statements by SPLM last year that there would be a revenue-sharing agreement.
However there is room for manoeuvre when he continues, "There’s going to be an agreement on the South continuing exporting its oil through the pipeline in Northern Sudan and to Port Sudan, and the South will be paying pipeline fees for transportation... We may be paying a transit fee". Southerners may not like the idea of "sharing" their wealth with a separate country, but may find it easier to accept a simple commercial transaction which is a normal process elsewhere in the world - to pay for the use of the pipeline and also to pay a transit fee. These "commercial" fees would of course have to add up to an amount which Khartoum finds acceptable, so after some hard bargaining it would be no surprise if it came close to the existing 50% in real terms. One area where the South will benefit financially is that they will now control the oil revenue; it is widely believed that Khartoum is currently giving them less than their true 50% share.
While searching for new export routes will definitely benefit the South (especially if routes can be found which are both economically and practically feasible within a reasonable time frame), it would not be beneficial for the North, and could thus be a destabilising factor in relations between the two newly independent countries.
Thankfully I don’t think alternative routes are at all economically viable, a new pipeline through Kenya would be prohibitively expensive. But don’t let that stop Southern politicians dangling Kenya as a bargaining tool.
25 January 2025
Photo of the Day
Of votes counted so far in the referendum, 98.81% have been for secession. Seems like a good occasion to post this photo of a billboard in Khartoum, taken by a friend during the 2008 Census.

11 January 2025
Southern Sudan: What happens next?
The referendum is finally here. I am overjoyed for the people of Southern Sudan. There is no doubt that there will be a resounding vote for independence. So what happens next?
The short answer - not very much actually changes. The Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) has been in existence for 5 years now, with responsibility for the majority of core government functions.
There are serious challenges to be faced in terms of building functional capability and increasing accountability, but they are the same challenges which have existed for the past 5 years. Nothing is about to fall apart, any more than it already has done.
With perhaps one major exception. GOSS has so far not had to deal with monetary policy, and this is a serious concern. Establishing a new currency and managing the risks of inflation for the first time will be extremely difficult. And as Keynes said, “There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose” (HT:TH).
Another concern is the potential for new borrowing once the South becomes a sovereign nation, which is really not needed when oil prices are so high and spending controls still too loose.
Southern Sudan has some smart leaders who understand many of the challenges. Robert Klitgaard discusses meeting Pagan Amum and Deng Alor in 2005, and the sharp grasp they had of the scourge of corruption and the difficulty in creating accountability. But good policy and good decisions take more than a few good individuals - establishing good systems is difficult and will take time, as will training enough mid- and lower level civil servants to run these systems.
A distinct positive should be an influx of Southern politicians and government officials from Khartoum, who have been serving as part of the Government of National Unity (GoNU). This influx will create some welcome competition for the top jobs (and hopefully not just new Ministries to accommodate them).
And finally one question to which I’m not sure anyone has the answer: what shall we call you country 193?
07 January 2025
ICG-CSIS Online Sudan Referendum Event
“Sudan: Post-Referendum Scenarios and the Way Forward”
on Monday, January 10, 2025 8:30am - 10:00am
with International Crisis Group’s new Africa Program Director, Comfort Ero, and its AU and Sudan Special Advisor, Fouad Hikmat.
27 December 2024
It's fashionable to knock GOSS
It's fashionable to knock GOSS, so it's refreshing to see an article which gives credit where credit is due… One hopes that this new-found respect for GOSS will spill over when the USA "urges Sudan’s Kiir to reach agreement with NCP" and that this will not lead to the "moral equivalence" argument so ably analysed by Eric Reeves in a piece I circulated on 22nd December 2010. GOSS, SPLM and the people of the south have already made significant concessions and have signed agreements with the NCP. The onus is now on NCP to implement what it has agreed, not on GOSS/SPLM to make further concessions.
23 December 2024
The Royal African Society on the Sudan Referendum
The Royal African Society has put together a collection of opinion pieces on the referendum.
Stephen Chan from my old school SOAS nails it for me:
I do not see a return to war.
Autonomous administration has meant the creation of a space of public administration AND the sense of defensible borders. Both sides have amassed traditional armour. War would mean not a return to guerrilla war, but the inauguration of conventional war. The oil blocks would be right in the middle. Neither China nor the West would tolerate any resort to significant hostilities. If Wikileaks bothered to look at the diplomatic cable traffic on this issue, that would become clear.

10 December 2024
What happened to all the interventionists?
UPDATE: I found one! G. Pascal Zachary, africanist-journo-professor asks:
Is it time to remove Gbagbo by force?
Rebecca?

07 December 2024
George Clooney in Southern Sudan
Kristof is somewhat predictably a fan.
I admire Clooney (and Ann Curry of NBC, who went with him and got an hour on Dateline) for trying to raise an alarm bell in the night. Let’s hope that the alarms, and the latest burst of diplomacy and spotlight on South Sudan, are enough to avert a new war.Tom Murphy
worries that this over-simplifies what is going on in SudanI'm actually going to side with Kristof on this one. Whilst I don't think that a return to war is the most likely to outcome, it is a possibility, and given the track record of the US in helping to broker the 2005 CPA I do think that US diplomacy could be important in ensuring a peaceful outcome.
I don't think that a return to war is likely because I think that ultimately both sides are going to behave rationally, by which I mean in their own self-interest. The Khartoum government has a strong interest in not losing the oil revenues from the South, but an even stronger interest in not having all oil production come to a halt completely due to a return to war. The cost to the SPLM of building a new pipeline through Kenya is basically prohibitive, and they have already indicated that they would be willing to pay hefty pipeline fees to Khartoum, even to the point of extending the current 50:50 split.
Added to the mix for Khartoum is that arrest warrant for Bashir, the desire to get sanctions lifted, and the desire to get some relief on that $30bn of debt.
There is a lot of space for a mutually profitable deal to be made, if cool heads can be made to prevail.
